Determinism, Statistics, and Free Will 


On the other hand, a "free will" advocate might take an interest in understanding and prediction, and would seek to anticipate the future and solve potential problems before they occur, rather than simply reacting to the past. 

Quantum mechanics is the most accurate and least uncertain of all theories. It predicts the wavelength or frequency of atomic emissions to an accuracy of 1 part in a billion or better. I have some uncertainty about just how accurate it is, but I'm certain that no other theory comes close to the level of accuracy of QM in predicting observable properties of matter. Even though individual particles have considerable latitude and unpredictability, their statistical behavior is more precisely determined than the house returns at a Las Vegas casino.

If only we had such accurate theories of the macroscopic world! I've been reading Michael Crichton's "State of Fear" to shake up my thoughts about global warming and climate change. His novel is a political tract, but he makes a convincing case that global warming has a weak basis in fact, and raises the possibility of political agendas having been pursued by both sides of the argument. He gives a strong appearance of having no political agenda before approaching the subject, and ends up comparing conventional wisdom about global warming with the level of acceptance enjoyed by eugenics prior to WWII. That is a pretty sobering comparison.

What does this have to do with determinism and free will? Well, we are in the process of deciding what, if anything, to do about our impacts upon the environment. We decide every day on an individual basis, and the statistics of that over populations determine how things go for us in the longer term. If we err on the side of nonchalance about emissions and waste, it could come back to us as a ruined ecology. If we err on the side of wasteful regulation without any tangible benefit, or with unintended consequences, it could be just as harmful. The key to getting it right lies in the accurate understanding and prediction of how the environment will respond to changes, which is difficult to obtain when politics gets involved in scientific investigations. Crichton ends up making a case for depoliticizing basic science by decoupling it from its sources of its funding. That's a tall order! Expensive science is always funded by interested parties, inside or outside of governments.

A determinist might take a "free market" approach to this and say that people will behave according to the consequences of their past behavior. If gas prices go sky high, we will necessarily learn to moderate our use of it. No need to understand the problem; just take one day at at time, and let individuals exercise their free will.

On the other hand, a "free will" advocate might take an interest in understanding and prediction, and would seek to anticipate the future and solve potential problems before they occur, rather than simply reacting to the past. The solutions may motivate government regulation or intervention, with the apparent effect of limiting the free will of individuals. This is perhaps acceptable in a representative government.

This paradoxical situation returns us to the issues of QM and the predictability of individuals versus the predictability of populations. Scientists seek to learn principles with broad predictive applicability, and to persuade populations to make use of them, as memes. Governments try to enhance adoption by regulating, and they often make mistakes in the process, as Crichton points out with many examples. Still, it seems we are obliged to make the best use possible of our intelligence, knowing that if at first we don't succeed, we will try again. 

Posted: Tue - February 8, 2005 at 09:46 p.m.         | |


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