Determinism, Statistics, and Free Will
On the other hand, a "free will" advocate might
take an interest in understanding and prediction, and would seek to anticipate
the future and solve potential problems before they occur, rather than simply
reacting to the past.
Quantum mechanics is the most accurate and least
uncertain of all theories. It predicts the wavelength or frequency of atomic
emissions to an accuracy of 1 part in a billion or better. I have some
uncertainty about just how accurate it is, but I'm certain that no other theory
comes close to the level of accuracy of QM in predicting observable properties
of matter. Even though individual particles have considerable latitude and
unpredictability, their statistical behavior is more precisely determined than
the house returns at a Las Vegas
casino.
If only we had such accurate
theories of the macroscopic world! I've been reading Michael Crichton's "State
of Fear" to shake up my thoughts about global warming and climate change. His
novel is a political tract, but he makes a convincing case that global warming
has a weak basis in fact, and raises the possibility of political agendas having
been pursued by both sides of the argument. He gives a strong appearance of
having no political agenda before approaching the subject, and ends up comparing
conventional wisdom about global warming with the level of acceptance enjoyed by
eugenics prior to WWII. That is a pretty sobering
comparison.
What does this have to do
with determinism and free will? Well, we are in the process of deciding what, if
anything, to do about our impacts upon the environment. We decide every day on
an individual basis, and the statistics of that over populations determine how
things go for us in the longer term. If we err on the side of nonchalance about
emissions and waste, it could come back to us as a ruined ecology. If we err on
the side of wasteful regulation without any tangible benefit, or with unintended
consequences, it could be just as harmful. The key to getting it right lies in
the accurate understanding and prediction of how the environment will respond to
changes, which is difficult to obtain when politics gets involved in scientific
investigations. Crichton ends up making a case for depoliticizing basic science
by decoupling it from its sources of its funding. That's a tall order! Expensive
science is always funded by interested parties, inside or outside of
governments.
A determinist might take a
"free market" approach to this and say that people will behave according to the
consequences of their past behavior. If gas prices go sky high, we will
necessarily learn to moderate our use of it. No need to understand the problem;
just take one day at at time, and let individuals exercise their free
will.
On the other hand, a "free will"
advocate might take an interest in understanding and prediction, and would seek
to anticipate the future and solve potential problems before they occur, rather
than simply reacting to the past. The solutions may motivate government
regulation or intervention, with the apparent effect of limiting the free will
of individuals. This is perhaps acceptable in a representative
government.
This paradoxical situation
returns us to the issues of QM and the predictability of individuals versus the
predictability of populations. Scientists seek to learn principles with broad
predictive applicability, and to persuade populations to make use of them, as
memes. Governments try to enhance adoption by regulating, and they often make
mistakes in the process, as Crichton points out with many examples. Still, it
seems we are obliged to make the best use possible of our intelligence, knowing
that if at first we don't succeed, we will try again.
Posted: Tue - February 8, 2005 at 09:46 p.m.
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